

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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22 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: Analysis of Possible Future Contingencies

1. The ramifications of a number of possible key events - some apparently positive and others negative - deserve examination. I have put together the list below, and plan to put out short, informal memos examining their implications for use by appropriate officials around town. I see these memos not as research projects but as the distillation of the experience and thinking of intelligence officers and managers. As we have discussed previously, I believe this kind of analysis, plus forecasting of likely trends, is missing from the normal production processes.

2. While several subjects or hypothetical scenarios appear to merit this kind of treatment, I plan to start with the following short list:

- a. Husayn decides to negotiate on basis Reagan initiative with West Bankers but w/o PLO authorization: Likelihood; who will be Palestinians; reaction of PLO; Syrians; Saudis; Iraqis; Egyptians; Israelis; benefit or detriment to US; impact on Jordan of failure.
- b. Because of nuclear and technology transfer issues, the new US military relationship with Pakistan has largely aborted: Likely Pakistan policies; effect on Afghanistan; China; India.
- c. As of Summer, 1983, a negotiated withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon has not been achieved. Both Syrian and Israeli force levels are down, but PLO remains as is. Both Israeli and Syrian surrogate forces are in place. What are costs to US of this situation, and regional impact?

3. Should these prove useful to consumers, I may follow up with some or all of the subjects included in the following, somewhat longer, list:

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
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- a. Contrary to expectation, Arafat does give a meaningful mandate to Husayn and also makes a statement of recognition. Will the PLO split; reaction of Syria; Israel? If a split occurs, would this benefit our policy, or work to its detriment? ☐
- b. As of Summer, 1983, petroleum producing states have dipped into reserves and decided to cut security assistance. Likelihood and impact on security and economic assistance programs in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan. ☐
- c. Israel's official policy on West Bank/Gaza changes positively and accepts the principle of territorial compromise with Jordan. What options for territorial compromise have been considered in the past, and what formulas may now be available?
- d. Iran ultimately succeeds in a military breakthrough, and advances into Iraqi territory. Saddam is overthrown, and a more "accommodating" regime created. Reaction of Syria; Jordan, Gulf States; Saudi Arabia; Turkey. ☐
- e. Khomeini dies, and the Iranian succession is contested. Soviet troops move into Azerbaijan with the stated objective of only ensuring order in that province. Likely reaction of regional states to US desires to deploy troops to the general area; attitudes towards the Soviet action. ☐
- f. Economic stringencies and political dissatisfaction lead to prolonged unrest and replacement of Mubarak by the Egyptian military. Diplomatic relations with Israel are broken, although the regime identifies with the moderate Arab consensus. Likely reactions of Israel; Arab states; Soviets; likely regime policies towards US.

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